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How to cure the trade balance? Reducing budget deficits versus devaluations 
in the presence of J- and W-curves for Brazil 
 
Thomas Ziesemer, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O.Box 616, NL 6200 
MD Maastricht. E-mail: T.Ziesemer@algec.unimaas.nl .1  
Abstract. We analyze empirically for Brazil a hypothesis by Stiglitz (2002) saying that devaluations 
may be more effective in reducing trade deficits than cuts in budget deficits. We find that the 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Devaluations have a stronger impact on the trade deficit than 
budget deficits when doing the analysis with yearly or monthly data even when the effect from a risk 
variable obtained from a TARCH estimate is subtracted. Devaluations have an effect that lasts 25 
months. A J-or W-curve can be obtained from a polynomial distributed lag estimate. Devaluations can 
explain almost 19% of consumer price inflation. However, if inflation control is a task assigned to 
monetary policy rather than exchange rate policy, devaluations are available as an instrument to 
stabilize the trade balance under shocks rather than keeping exchange rates fixed through sales of 
reserves. This may avoid overvaluations, speculative attacks and currency crises. The results for the 
trade balance hold for several updates except for the last one, where budget deficits and exchange rate 
changes change signs. This suggests a role for imported investments and elasticity pessimism and 
casts doubts on the role of cutting budget deficits and devaluations in regard to the trade balance. 
Stability tests suggest that structural change seems to play a role. The change in signs of our estimates 
may have been caused by a change of exchange rate policies leading to appreciations since June 2004 
and by an extraordinarily strong industrial recession in 2003 in some countries. If Ricardian 
equivalence for the trade balance is imposed by assumption we find a weakly significant N-curve for 
exchange rate risk jointly with a J-curve for devaluations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Jean Pierre Urbain for useful comments and to Huub Meijers for providing and helping me 
with his calcall module for eviews. Responsibility is entirely mine. 
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How to cure the trade balance? Reducing budget deficits versus devaluations 
in the presence of J- and W-curves for Brazil 
Abstract. We analyze empirically for Brazil a hypothesis by Stiglitz (2002) saying that devaluations 
may be more effective in reducing trade deficits than cuts in budget deficits. We find that the 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Devaluations have a stronger impact on the trade deficit than 
budget deficits when doing the analysis with yearly or monthly data even when the effect from a risk 
variable obtained from a TARCH estimate is subtracted. Devaluations have an effect that lasts 25 
months. A J-or W-curve can be obtained from a polynomial distributed lag estimate. Devaluations can 
explain almost 19% of consumer price inflation. However, if inflation control is a task assigned to 
monetary policy rather than exchange rate policy, devaluations are available as an instrument to 
stabilize the trade balance under shocks rather than keeping exchange rates fixed through sales of 
reserves. This may avoid overvaluations, speculative attacks and currency crises. The results for the 
trade balance hold for several updates except for the last one, where budget deficits and exchange rate 
changes change signs. This suggests a role for imported investments and elasticity pessimism and 
casts doubts on the role of cutting budget deficits and devaluations in regard to the trade balance. 
Stability tests suggest that structural change seems to play a role. The change in signs of our estimates 
may have been caused by a change of exchange rate policies leading to appreciations since June 2004 
and by an extraordinarily strong industrial recession in 2003 in some countries. If Ricardian 
equivalence for the trade balance is imposed by assumption we find a weakly significant N-curve for 
exchange rate risk jointly with a J-curve for devaluations.  
 
1. Motivation 
It is a common property of many debt crises that the countries in trouble have a huge amount 
of foreign debt falling due within a short period (see Radelet and Sachs 1998). When 
countries have difficulties to repay debt, the natural way to increase the potential for 
repayment is to increase the trade surplus of goods and non-factor payments. In his recent 
book Stiglitz (2002) emphasizes that the IMF prefers to achieve this without devaluations and 
by a reduction of government deficits only. Stiglitz clearly indicates that he finds it preferable 
to support this process by devaluations. In the case of Brazil in 2002 the agreement with the 
IMF does not exclude devaluation policies as can be seen from the dropping of the exchange 
rate anchor in the vain of the switch to inflation targeting in 1999.2 The IMF and Brazil did 
agree that Brazil should achieve an increasing budget surplus, but as a matter of fact the Real 
is falling in the first half of 2003. One may want to speculate that Brazil prefers Stiglitz’ view 
                                                 
2 See Amann and Baer (2003) for the recent development in Brazil and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for 
an introduction to inflation targeting.   
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and does not try to avoid due devaluations. Brazil as a big debtor is too powerful to allow for 
a one-sided imposition of a policy of budget deficit reductions only and the IMF has followed 
the introduction of inflation targeting in connection with dropping the idea of using the 
exchange rate as an anchor with great interest.3 By implication, the case of Brazil, with its 
many devaluations, is a natural experiment to study the relative impact of budget deficits and 
devaluations on the trade balance, which is the purpose of this paper. Therefore we marry 
aspects from two strands of literature: The regressions of trade deficits on budget deficits and 
the regressions of trade balance on exchange rates yielding J-curves and related constructs. In 
particular, we want to know, which of these two variables has a stronger impact. We study 
this twice: once, in section 2, for the period 1980-1998 where hyperinflation ended in 1994 
using yearly data and once, in section 3, for the period after hyperinflation, 1998 – 2005 
(march) using monthly data with updates in several steps, where no earlier data are available 
for  budget deficits. In section 4 we discuss the standard counter argument of imported 
inflation or inflation pass through. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Some regressions for the trade balance with yearly data 
The basic agreement between the IMF and Brazil is to reduce (increase) the central 
governments overall budget deficit (surplus) per unit of GDP. As this is a percentage rate, the 
natural variable to consider is the external balance of goods and services per unit of GDP. 
Data for the budget deficit are available in the World Development Indicators, from which we 
take all data used in this section, for the years 1980-1998 (with the exception of 1995 and 
1996)4. This is mainly the high inflation period. As Brazil has undergone many reforms since 
the Latin American debt crisis, data for earlier periods may be of limited value anyway. For 
the years since 1980 the pure regression relation between the trade surplus and the budget 
                                                 
3 See Bogdanski et al. (2000). 
4 WDI 2004 fills in a zero for these two years, which we do not take over but rather treat it as missing values. 
1998 is the last value given in WDI 2004.  
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deficit both as percentage of the GDP is shown as regression 1 in Table 1. This preliminary 
estimate would suggest that a one percent reduction in the budget per unit of GDP increases 
the trade balance as a percentage of GDP by 0.27 percent. The budget deficit is a significant 
variable. The negative intercept suggests that there may be a trade deficit even if the budget 
deficit were zero. The budget deficit has no unit root according to the standard tests but this 
suffers from the low number of observations. The trade surplus has no unit root for the period 
from 1960-2001, but has a unit root if it is taken only from 1980 onwards. But again this 
suffers from the low number of observations. Therefore we consider unit root tests only for 
the longest possible period of each variable. As it remains unclear that this is also adequate for 
the short period available because of the limited data availability concerning budget deficits 
we will also estimate first differences of the basic equations with added lagged residuals of 
the level equations. Moreover, in regard to the specification we follow in the first instance our 
own economic intuition rather than relying on stationarity tests, which may be unreliable for a 
low number of variables. The residuals of the regression are stationary at the 1% level and 
therefore we may consider the equation as cointegrated. However, adding a quadratic time 
trend to the regression, which is significant for both, the time variable and its squared value, 
the budget deficit variable is significant and the coefficient drops to -.13 (not shown). 
Running the regression in first differences with the lagged residuals of Regression 1 as an 
additional regressor yields a coefficient of -.20 (see regression 2 in Table 1 with low 
explanatory power). This equation is robust against adding time variables, but the F-
probability is much worse now. The effects of time variables will vanish in the more complex 
level regressions below. Due to the low number of observations we cannot use vector error 
correction methods. Therefore we first proceed by using level equations and then we will 
estimate in first differences.5  
                                                 
5 What also considered using the methods discussed in Maddala and Kim (1998), which use level equations and 
add lagged error correction terms (Phillips-Loretan non-linear method) or leads and lags of first differences of 
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TABLE 1 OVER HERE 
The natural next step now is to extend the regression by adding the exchange rate to it, 
because Stiglitz recommends this as a second instrument to increase the trade surplus. 
Exchange rae data in the WDI are corrected for the currency reforms. Because of the well-
known J-curve effect we have included the percentage rate of devaluations of the official 
exchange rate without and with lags of one and two periods in all combinations. As exports in 
the trade surplus variable depend on world income we have added a world income variable. 
As imports and the denominator of the surplus and the budget deficit depend on the GDP of 
Brazil, we have also added the GDP of Brazil as a variable.6 Moreover, as the trade and 
budget variables may be affected differently by inflation, we also add the percentage change 
of the GDP deflator.  
There are five mechanisms by which the budget deficits may have an impact on the 
trade balance.7  
First, the budget deficit has a negative impact on the trade balance probably because it 
raises the price level and therefore reduces the competitiveness of exports.  
Second, deficits enhance imports directly or via the creation of income. Both effects 
may be mitigated by subsequent devaluations. This also allows for a distinction between 
percentage rates of inflation and price level effects, and other devaluation effects. Levels or 
lagged growth rates of the exchange rates give worse results than the growth rate of the 
current exchange rate. Seemingly there is little support for the J-curve effect when using 
                                                                                                                                                        
lagged regressors (Saikkonen’s dynamic OLS) or lags of first differences of dependent and independent 
variables (Hendry’s method). For the first two methods we have too low a number of observations and for the 
last method we did not get any good result probably for the same reason.  
6 Without doing so some regressions break down when adding a (quadratic) time trend and therefore we jump to 
the comprehensive regression rather than proceeding from simple to general following the argumentation in the 
debate. Adding a terms of trade variable leads to highly insignificant results. This result may be obtained because 
‘... the nominal exchange rate accounts for most of the variation in the real exchange rate...’ (Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Miteza 2002 and Joyce and Kamas 2003). Using logs of the GDP variables yields worse result in the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test.  
7 See Salman Saleh (2003) for more details of the arguments. 
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yearly data in this high-inflation period of Brazil where international contracts are written in 
dollar terms.  
A third effect is that the financing of the deficit increases interest rates, which may 
reduce investment and therefore imported inputs. This direct effect is favorable for the trade 
balance.  
Fourth, past values of variables induce expectations of deficits.8  
Fifth, an increase in the interest rate attracts capital inflows, which in turn increase the 
exchange rate and reduces the trade balance unless private savings are increased sufficiently 
strongly to neutralize the effect of the deficit. This latter case is the Ricardian equivalence 
where the budget deficit has no impact on the trade deficit. The other case, where the trade 
balance is affected is usually called the Keynesian proposition or conventional view (see 
Vamvoukas (1997). Actually the view of the IMF, which is often held to have a neoclassical 
bias, then is a conventional Keynesian one and Stiglitz suggests letting the price mechanism 
work, which is normally expressing the neoclassical view. Thus, both borrow arguments in 
the other ‘camp’ and our research question can be read as asking ‘Should they do this?’. 
Given the sign obtained so far in our regressions the reduction of imported inputs is 
dominated by the other four and there is no Ricardian equivalence.  
With all the variables discussed above we get the result of regression 3 in Table 1. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic is close to two and also a Breusch-Godfrey test does not show any 
autocorrelation. The RESET test is quite good but non-suitable if we have I(1) variables. The 
GDP of Brazil is a doubtlessly stationary variable in this regression. The inflation rate is also 
                                                 
8 See Kasa (1994) and Piersanti (2000). In both cases expected variables derived from forward-looking 
theoretical models are ultimately replaced by lagged ones. Both authors use the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil model. In 
that model the exchange-rate changes do not appear as a right-hand side variable in the regression. Therefore we 
cannot use that framework for our problem statement.   
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stationary at the 3.3% significance level. All other variables are I(1).9 Therefore we estimate 
this equation also in first differences (see regression 4 in Table 1). The constant and the world 
income variable now have a very low significance. The absolute value of the coefficient of the 
budget deficit decreases drastically. It is half that of the level equation and close to the value 
of regression 2. However, if we add the lagged residuals of the level equation (see regression 
5), that coefficient is back to .38.10 The coefficient for the growth rate of the exchange rate is 
the same in all the regressions but those of the other variables change. The Breusch-Godfrey 
test again does not show serial correlation although the result is less strong now, and the 
RESET test has a weak result now. Adding lagged residuals seems to be slightly overdone as 
the RESET test gave much better results for regressions 3 and 4 in Table 1 before.  
The preliminary interpretation of the regression in levels (first differences) is as 
follows. Any reduction in the budget deficit per unit of GDP increases the trade surplus per 
unit of GDP by about 0.44 (.21) times the change in the former. This supports to some extent 
the argument of the IMF to reduce budget deficits if the objective is to improve the trade 
balance. Any change in the percentage of devaluations changes the trade balance as percent of 
the GDP by 2.24 (2.62) times the change in the devaluations. This is an elasticity that also 
supports the standard assumption that the Marshall-Lerner stability condition is full-filled for 
the trade balance even without the restrictive assumptions of balanced trade.11 The inflation 
rate and the exchange rate are ‘monetary’ variables, which enter the regression as growth rates 
because their real effect (at least in the inflationary phase) depends on the relative speed with 
which they move. Our result that the nominal devaluation has a real impact on the trade 
balance is in line with recent research showing that nominal devaluations lead to real 
                                                 
9 For the growth rate of the exchange rate with data for 1960-2001 the marginal significance levels according to 
the standard tests are as follows: ADF:.21; DF-GLS below 10%; Phillips-Perron .21; the KPSS hypothesis that 
dlne is stationary is rejected at the 5% level; ERS (and Ng-Perron slightly) higher than 10% level.   
10 This is done somewhat ad hoc in analogy to the procedure for the two variables case, because we do not have 
enough observations for the Johansen procedure. 
11 See Hooper and Marquez (1995) p.112. 
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devaluations (see Bahmani-Oskooee and Miteza 2002 and Joyce and Kamas 2003). When 
world income is replaced by a time variable, there are similar results (not shown). But time is 
less significant than world income, which proxies for the income of the countries to which 
Brazil exports. Inflation seems to have only a weak though significant impact.   
In order to analyze the relative impact of the variables, we calculate the averages of the 
variables, insert them into the regression equation, and divide by the left-hand side. As a 
result we see, which regressor explains what percentage of the trade balance surplus. We do 
this for the level and the first difference versions (regressions 3, 4 and 5), because none of 
them seems to be clearly better than the other given the limits of unit root tests for low 
numbers of observations.  
TABLE 2 OVER HERE 
In each part of Table 2 we show the coefficients of the regression in the first line. The 
second line shows the average values of the variables. The third line shows the product of line 
one and line two, i.e. the product of regression coefficients and average values. The last line 
gives the result of dividing the regression by the average value of the (change of) the trade 
surplus, which is the percentage each variable explains of the dependent variable. The first 
block shows the result for the estimate in levels from regression 3. The GDP variables have 
by far the strongest impact; the budget deficits explain slightly less of the trade surplus than 
devaluations but more than inflation does.  
In the second part of Table 2, belonging to regression 4, GDP movements have again 
the strongest impact. Devaluations have a slightly larger impact than inflation and budget 
deficits have the smallest impact.  
The results for regression 5 show again that the impact of GDP variables is the 
strongest. The second strongest now is inflation, but devaluations are almost four times as 
strong as budget deficits are.    
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As GDP movements are not available as instruments of economic policy in regard to 
the trade balance, we can conclude that, for a given rate of inflation, the impact of 
devaluations is larger than that of reducing budget deficits for the period under consideration 
and estimates in first differences. This provides support for Stiglitz’ argument and there is no 
Ricardian equivalence but rather the Keynesian proposition holds. Borrowing arguments in 
the other camp seems justified. By implication, both the budget deficits and devaluations can 
be used to reduce the trade deficit. 
   The critical question is whether or not this holds also for times of low inflation. 
 
3. The trade balance in the period 1998 – 2005 with monthly data. 
Data and econometric aspects 
In the second but last stage of working with monthly data in summer 2004, we had data from 
the Central Bank of Brazil12 all ending either in April or May 2004 (see Table 3), or, for 
industrial production indices between November 2003 and January 2004. In the second phase, 
one year later we had more observations.  
There are some noteworthy problems here when going to an analysis with monthly data. First, 
in the possible presence of a J-curve effect using monthly data implies that about 24 lags have 
to be used. As exchange rates are available for three and a half more years than budget 
deficits this does not cause any loss of observations but it means that we estimate a large 
number of coefficients with still a low number of observations. Second, in regard to unit roots 
Table 3 reveals that the AIC selection criterion often tells that we have unit roots, whereas the 
SIC criterion does oppose this view. The Phillips-Perron test, which does not depend on these 
criteria does not reveal unit roots. Moreover, when we had data only until December 2003 all 
our variables were stationary. Third, the nominal exchange rate is stationary as found by 
                                                 
12 See http://www.bcb.gov.br  
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Minella et al. (2003) if we use data only from July 1994 onwards, but are I(1) if we use only 
observations from 1998 onwards.13 We use its growth rate and also the growth rate of the 
GDP, both of which are stationary. Our inflation variables are stationary. We conclude that 
the data are at least very close to being stationary.    
TABLE 3 OVER HERE 
Next, we do not have monthly GDP data for world income. Therefore we will approximate 
them by a time trend variable and industrial production indices for the USA, UK, Germany, 
France, Japan and Canada from the IMF-IFS also taken from the websites of the Central Bank 
of Brazil. The USA imports five times as much from Brazil as the second largest importer, the 
Netherlands. Many developing countries import about as much as the other OECD trading 
partners do, but we do not have their production indices. The most important data are then of 
course those of the USA. But we are lacking an important variable not knowing how good the 
proxies are. 
In regard to exogeneity and causality we would imagine that budget deficits are policy 
variables, financial markets determine exchanges rates, and (the growth of) the stocks of 
capital and labour largely determined the GDP variable, where the investment rates are 
determined by long-run profitability expectations. In this sense we assume that right-hand side 
variables are exogenous except for the lagged dependent variable. Using vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models would be desirable in order to test for causality and endogeneity, but then we 
would have to estimate many parameters. In particular, in the presence of a J-curve we would 
need to allow for extremely many lags. Moreover, monthly investment data are not available 
and when we tried a VAR the equation for the GDP gives very bad results which may 
contaminate the other equations if we proceed in the seemingly unrelated regression mode. 
Therefore we proceed with the assumptions made above.  
                                                 
13 This may point into the direction of a stochastic unit root problem found by Bleany and Leybourne (2003) or it 
appears because more random is coming in with flexible exchange rates. 
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With monthly data the difficulty is to find the appropriate number of lags. We 
proceeded in the following steps. First, we ran some regressions similar to those of the 
previous section trying to add some more lags in an intuitive manner. Here it turned out that 
the first lag of the dependent variable, the second lag of the budget deficit variable, the current 
growth rate of the GDP, the fifth lag of the industrial inflation index and most of about 26 lags 
of the exchange rate growth rate as well as the squared time variable were always significant. 
Some other lags of the industrial and agricultural inflation index, the second lag of the 
dependent variable, the time index and many of the lags of the industrial production indices 
were sometimes significant, but far from always. We did run 33.5 million regressions in 
which the first group of variables was always included and the second would be tried in all 
possible combinations. The program used would use the ordinary least squares method and 
select those regressions in which the second group variables are significant at the 10% level. 
These were 182 regressions. These 182 regressions then were tested according to the standard 
battery of tests: The Jarque-Bera test of normality, the Breusch-Godfrey test for serial 
correlation with two lagged residuals, the White heteroscedasticity test (if possible), the 
Ramsey RESET test14, the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test and the one and n-step 
forecast test. Among those of the 182 equations passing these tests, we did drop the non-
significant (according to the Newey-West correction for heteroscedastivcity and 
autocorrelation) exchange rate growth rates and if necessary also other variables and ran again 
the whole test battery. From the remaining regressions we did select the regression with the 
highest adjusted R-squared, and the lowest Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria, 
standard error of regression and sum of squared residuals. Fortunately, it turned out that the 
best regression with deleted exchange rate terms is obtained from the best regression with 
                                                 
14 We report the worst result from adding up to four fitted terms. 
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undeleted insignificant exchange rate variables. These regressions are presented in Table 4 
and the trade balance accounting in Table 5. 
TABLE 4 OVER HERE 
Tables 4B and C (see Appendix, also for the corresponding accounting calculations) 
have similar regressions, but the selection has been made not using the above mentioned 
selection criteria but rather selecting those which perform best in the standard test battery, 
because some of the test results in Table 4 are a bit meager. Unfortunately, all of these 
regressions still estimate a large number of coefficients with a low number of variables. 
However, according to the Schwarz criterion mentioned above they are better then their 
alternatives (not shown) with a lower number of coefficients and variables. Regressions with 
lower number of variables are mainly those who drop the industrial production indices, when 
going through all combinations with significant variables only. In terms of results they have 
sums of exchange rate coefficients, which are half as large as the sum of the regressions in 
Table 4 and also the coefficient of the budget deficit variable is half as large as in Table 4. In 
both regressions of Table 4 the coefficients are about equally large although we have dropped 
four of the exchange rate lags.  
Interpretation of the results   
The budget deficit enhances the trade deficit with a lag of two months. The coefficient is 
about .11. This means that any change in the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP is 
translated by a factor 1/9 into the trade deficit. In all of the 182 regressions there was not 
anyone passing the standard test battery when this deficit variable was dropped. The 
Ricardian equivalence does not appear here. The growth rate of the GDP enhances the deficit 
with a coefficient of 5.5%. This means that one percent more growth results in .055% higher 
trade deficit as a percent of GDP, which is a combination of the effect that not only imports 
are increasing but also the denominator of the dependent variable. The squared time variable 
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has a significant but very small coefficient. Next, sixteen of the lagged growth rates of the 
industrial production index of the OECD countries have a significant impact with different 
signs though. The expected negative sign is present for all USA variables and one from 
France. Growth especially in the USA increases Brazil’s exports and reduces its trade deficits. 
The positive sign of the other countries’ growth of the industrial production index can be 
explained along the lines of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994): The growth rate reflects not 
only demand but also productivity growth, which decreases the prices of OECD countries’ 
goods and thereby enhances the trade deficit. As most of inflation may be captured in 
devaluations, we find a small impact of only four inflation rates, three of which have the 
expected sign and increase the deficit. Only the two months lagged agricultural inflation rate 
reduces the trade deficit. Perhaps this reflects an intertemporal substitution effect.  
TABLE 5 OVER HERE 
   Now we can turn to the impact of devaluations and their strength relative to the other 
variables, especially the budget deficit reductions. The sum of the coefficients of all exchange 
rate variables, the long run coefficient, is about -1.97. The long-run coefficients are 
summarized in Table 5, panels (a) and (b), in the second column. The first column in this 
table has the average value of all these stationary variables. The third column contains the 
product of the coefficient and the average value for each variable. The fourth column is the 
value obtained when the third line is divided by the average value of the dependent variable. 
These numbers are percentages of the trade deficit explained by the corresponding variable. 
The interpretation is as follows. The constant and the growth rates of the industrial production 
indices each are about 55 or 45 times as large as the trade deficit as a percentage of GDP (plus 
the effect of the squared time variable, which is negligible though). These have by far the 
largest impact. The negative impact of devaluations is about 4.5 times as large as that of 
budget deficits. These results provide some support for Stiglitz’ view that devaluations maybe 
 13
more important than changes of deficits. The effect of the lagged trade deficit is almost half 
that of budget deficits. The smallest effect comes from Brazil’s GDP growth because its 
average value was a negative half percent during the period April 1998 through May 2003. 
This is the major difference with the section using yearly data. Industrial inflation has an 
impact that is smaller than that of devaluations, but larger than that of budget deficits, 
although we are in the low inflation period. Agricultural inflation has an impact that is as 
small as that of domestic growth.  
FIGURE 1 OVER HERE 
   It may be interesting to look at the effect of the lagged devaluations. In figure 1 we plot the 
coefficients of all the devaluations of regression 2 in Table 4, which go up and down strongly. 
The positive immediate effects are on the left side. The lagged effects are more to the right 
and less frequently positive. Next, we regress these coefficients on a polynomial of time. We 
get three equations with significant terms. The within sample forecasts are plotted in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 OVER HERE 
We get a variant of the J-curve effect here.15 The less time terms are in the regression, the less 
is the fluctuation reflected. The early effects are positive, but lagged effects reduce the trade 
deficits. This may be viewed as an example of the phenomenon that price changes and effects 
are small but may be important when cumulated over time, as expressed in the long-run 
coefficient of -1.97 in Table 5. The complete effect of devaluations is achieved only after 26 
months, whereas that of reducing budget deficits is obtained after two months. 
   Table 7 again has similar results, but following Singh (2004) we have added a significant 
exchange rate risk variable, which is the standard error of a static forecast (see Figure 3) from 
a TARCH(1) regression (see Table 6) of the growth rate of the exchange rate on two of its 
lags. The TARCH regression uses exchange rate data only since October 1994, the last big 
                                                 
15 The first two can also be read as a double W and the third as an inverted N-curve. 
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discreet jump in its value due to the end of hyperinflation. The estimate generates a stable 
difference equation in the exchange rate growth rate. The positive ARCH term indicates that 
errors increase volatility. The negative threshold effect in Tables 6 and 6b indicates that 
negative shocks to exchange rate growth reduce volatility. When our risk variable is added in 
Table 7 the risk reduces deficits.   
TABLE 6 and 6b, TABLE 7, Table 8, FIGURE 3 OVER HERE 
The impact of risk in Table 8, where the trade balance decomposition is repeated with the risk 
variable, is slightly larger than that of lagged trade deficits or budget deficits but only one 
fourth of the effect of exchange rate devaluations. The sum of coefficients of the devaluations 
has become larger now when risk is included. Even if this effect is subtracted from that of 
devaluations, devaluations affect trade deficits almost four times as strongly as budget deficits 
do. In sum, reduction in trade deficits is best achieved by growth in the USA and by 
devaluations under conditions of non-inflationary policies. 
   The previous regressions have a low number of observations relative to the number of 
parameters estimated. Therefore we replace the exchange rate variables by a polynomial 
distributed lag and get a figure that is comparable with a J- or W- curve. Sequential deletion 
of the then insignificant variables yields results presented in Table 9, which shows a J-curve 
pattern. In Table 10 we present the corresponding trade balance decomposition. Again 
changes of the exchange rate have a stronger effect of devaluations than those of budget 
deficits even after subtracting the effect of exchange rate risk, which is again persistent for 
about half a year. Inflation has a relatively stronger impact now. But of course the pdl method 
is fairly crude and serves mainly consuming less degrees of freedom and to show the J-curve 
pattern in a more stylized way. The latter can also be read as a W-curve found earlier for the 
USA in 1973-1985 (see Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha 2004, p.1379).   
TABLE 9, 10 
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In the above regressions we have presented the final results of several updates. In the 
meanwhile, more data have become available for about one year going until January to March 
2005 for the industrial production indices and until April 2005 for all the other variables. For 
this last update we concentrate on the TARCH approach and the polynomial distributed lag.  
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
   In the TARCH approach for the purpose of making the risk variable we use the Generalized 
Error Distribution now (see Table 6b), because this yields better forecast results (see Figure 
4). The Root Mean Squared Forecast Error is again about 4% but its decomposition now has a 
higher percentage in the unexplained covariance proportion.  
TABLE 11 
   We add the risk variable and one later as well as one earlier lag to those of the regression of 
Table 916 and then follow the stepwise regression procedure with some experiments of putting 
back eliminated variables. Table 11 summarizes the regression result. The sum of exchange 
rate change coefficients is now positive, indicating that the Marshall-Lerner condition is not 
fulfilled but rather elasticity pessimism is supported. The form of the curve is a mixture 
between J- and W-curve. The budget deficit variable – the first lag now - has a negative sign 
suggesting that the effect of interest rates on imported investments is dominating. Neither cuts 
of budget deficits nor devaluations are good for the trade balance although they may be good 
for other reasons. Another difference compared to Table 9 is that the industrial production 
indices matter much more and have a negative sign now, indicating higher demand reducing 
Brazil’s trade deficit. 
   This is a dramatic shift in results indicating structural change. This suggestion is confirmed 
by the number of observations indicating non-constancy of parameters for the one-step and 
the n-step forecast test (not shown). These may be due to the consequences of many changes 
                                                 
16 We do this instead of  going through the procedure starting with 33.5 million regressions again which took 17 
days of computer running time and would need an extension to include the risk variable, which enhances the 
number of regressions exponentially and also the time for the calculations.  
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since 1998: the Asian crisis in 1998, the move to inflation targeting in 1999, the onset of a 
recession in the industrial countries in 2000, and the Argentinean abandoning of the currency 
board. However, these phenomena were in the data at least partly also before the update. We 
speculate that the divergence of the growth rates of EU countries with those of the USA and 
Asian countries make the lack of a world income variable in our data more important.17 
Moreover, the natural log of the industrial production indices fell by about 20% in the single 
years of the second half of 2003 except in the USA and in Germany where it was smaller. 
This generates quite a different pattern of industrial production indices than in the period 
before the middle of 2003, where the regressions of Tables 7 and 9 stop. The Chow forecast 
test the industrial recession months August and September 2003 give a really strong 
indication for structural breaks.18 There is also a dramatic change in the exchange rate 
development of Brazil. Since October 2002 and even more so since June 2004 there is a clear 
trend of appreciations (see Figure 5) whereas the country had incremental depreciations after 
each currency reform since 1990. The Chow tests for breakpoints and forecasts cannot be 
carried out for July 1999. The Chow breakpoint tests are not rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no structural change for 2000M10-12 whereas the forecast test does reject it. This is the well-
known case of conflicting results from the Chow tests. For the later points of October 2002 
and June 2004 (only forecast test) the forecast test indicates structural change. For the later 
periods of appreciation the result of structural change is more obvious. If this can be 
interpreted as a new policy, which has induced a change in signs of our estimates, it may be a 
case of the Lucas critique. But the industrial recession and the consequences of the other 
events mentioned above probably play a role too.        
                                                 
17 It is not due to the change in the risk variable because we used the Gaussian risk variable with an update of 
Table 6 as well. 
18 We also tried quadratic terms of the industrial production indices, because we had the impression that in time 
of strong fluctuations non-linearities may be more important. This did not change the signs of the major results 
though. Similarly, estimation of the regression as a special case of one of the special cases of the TARCH-M 
family turned out to be in vain.     
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    In Table 12 we show that the imposition of the Ricardian equivalence assumption by 
abandoning the budget deficit variable yields a J-curve for the exchange rate and an N-curve 
for the polynomial distributed lag of the exchange rate risk variable, the latter with low 
significance for the lags though. The overall effect of devaluations and of risk is to reduce the 
trade deficit. However, when we put back the deficit variable, the sum of the coefficients of 
the exchange rate growth lags changes to a positive sign.   
              TABLE 12 OVER  
 4. Arguments against devaluations 
There are mainly two arguments against devaluations. First, devaluations can be induced by 
expansionary monetary policy at the cost of neighboring countries. It is clear from Stiglitz’ 
text that this is not what he has in mind. It is clear that growth of the money supply should be 
directed at keeping inflation under control without too much over or undershooting (see 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001). What Stiglitz has in mind is that shocks like world 
market interest rates and recessions as in the Latin American debt crisis of 1982 as well as 
contagion effects as those from the Asian debt crisis hitting Latin American countries require 
devaluations by letting the exchange rate go rather than selling foreign currency reserves. The 
question here is whether or not imported inflation is induced and sufficiently strongly so to 
deny the importance of devaluations as a means to cure the trade balance because of welfare 
reductions and redistributions through inflation.  
Devaluations may have an impact on the consumer price index because of imported consumer 
goods and on the GDP deflator because of imported inputs. We look at both. Imports are not 
part of the GDP. By implication, a devaluation leading to higher import prices of dollar 
contracts in terms of local currency units has no direct impact on the GDP deflator. The 
crucial question, however, is whether or not the increase in local currency prices of imported 
investment goods leads to higher costs and therefore higher inflation in the periods after the 
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devaluation. Inflation is explained statistically by the following regressions using yearly data. 
First, the GDP deflator and the growth rate of M2 may be considered as stationary at the ten 
percent level. When we allow for five lags in the ADF, the growth rate of the exchange rate is 
also stationary. This would justify estimating the equation in levels. The result for yearly data 
is presented in column 1 of Table 13. It is clear from these regressions that lagged 
devaluations, money and quasi money supply growth with and without lags as well as lagged 
inflation have an impact on the rate of inflation but deficits, which we tried also, do not have 
an impact. For all variables we tried up to three lags. Adding a time trend gives a highly 
insignificant result for the latter but does not change the significance of the other variables. 
Lagged devaluations, however, reduce inflation according to this regression. Basic lessons on 
multi-collinearity tell us that the sign of the exchange rate variable could be wrong if it 
actually causes inflation in the next period. If so, the sign should change if we take out 
inflation with one lag, infl(-1). But if we do so (not shown) the sign remains negative. The 
adj.R2 is lower. The intercept is much less significant now. We could find one way to get a 
positive sign of the devaluation: If M2gr(-2) causes the devaluation dlne(-2) we may have to 
take out the former. The intercept and the devaluation variable are getting highly insignificant. 
We cannot find support for imported GDP inflation through devaluation, but rather find 
stabilization. The critical question is what the share of lagged devaluations in explaining 
inflation is. The average GDP inflation is accounted for as follows (see Table 12, panel a). 
With a lag of two periods, devaluations have an impact on inflation. However, this effect is 
strongly negative. Devaluations do not reinforce GDP inflation by imported inflation in Brazil 
for this period. All positive impacts come from growth of money supply, which is also most 
strong with a two period lag. Imported inflation merely transfers inflation from the GDP to 
current imports with no further price effect on GDP inflation. The reason for this is that prices 
are already increased and firms have no need to increase prices again when imports have 
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prices, which are merely adjusted to inflation. Devaluations increase exports, allowing for 
more imported investment - if the latter are credit constrained and this dominates the higher 
costs for imported inputs - and therefore increases supply later, thus reducing inflation. As our 
variables are stationary only at the 10% significance level or with many lagged first 
differences it may be useful to confirm the regression in terms of first differences in all 
variables. The result is summarized in column 2 of Table 13, which is similar to the one in 
levels and a time variable is added. Again, lagged devaluations are stabilizing GDP inflation, 
not reinforcing it.   
TABLE 13 OVER HERE 
   This result may be different for the consumer price index, or CPI inflation. In terms of 
levels the result for CPI inflation is summarized in column 3 of Table 13. Here the budget 
deficit does appear as a significant variable and so does the exchange rate with all three lags. 
The exchange rate increases inflation except for the third lag, which is negatively correlated 
and therefore reduces inflation. Moreover, as the accounting-for-inflation calculations (see 
Table 14, panel b) show, there seems to be a strong impact of devaluation on the CPI 
inflation. The regression result is supported also when the regression is done in first 
differences (see Table 13, column 4) although the budget deficit gets insignificant now. 
However, the CPI is only close to being integrated of order one. It passes the ADF test only as 
a series that is integrated of order two. In terms of second differences (see Table 13, column 
4) only the third lagged growth rate of the exchange rate, which is stabilizing again, is 
significant. Imported inflation is absent. This latter equation also has no serial correlation 
according to the Breusch-Godfrey test. It is monetary growth that causes inflation and nothing 
else in this latter estimate.  
Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) indicate the existence of imported inflation for the 
period 1991-1998 by using simple correlation coefficients for annual inflation and lagged 
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nominal exchange rate depreciation, and find imported inflation. Their results correspond to 
the coefficients of our level equation for the CPI when one or two lags are used. Their method 
does not control for other variables as we do and seemingly does not take unit roots into 
account. The inflation data used by Minella et al. (2003, p.121-24) are reported being 
integrated of order zero. They derive exchange rate pass through as an impulse response to 
exchange rate shocks in a VAR model for the period since 1994. Given their finding of 
imported inflation for the period after the hyperinflation we should note that according to all 
experience reported in the inflation targeting literature, the preference now has moved to have 
no exchange rate anchor anymore and to allow for flexible exchange rates, with some 
qualification for portfolio shocks and excessive fluctuations (see Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel 2001, p.24 and Schmidt and Werner 2002, 58-89, Minella et al. 2003, p.122).     
 
 4. Summary and conclusion 
We have shown that devaluations contribute to trade surplus increases as much as 
budget deficit reductions do in the level estimate with yearly data and much more so in the 
estimate with first differences, but both do so much less than growth of the Brazilian economy 
and the World economy. This suggests that both variables can do little in the short run and 
have an impact mainly through cumulated effects on debt when policy starts using them as 
instruments early on. The Marshall-Lerner condition for stability is fulfilled but no J-curve is 
found.  
Using monthly data until the beginning of 2004, however, the impact of domestic 
growth is much smaller when growth rates of GDP variables are used because it is too low in 
the time period considered. But again, the Ricardian equivalence does not hold and 
devaluations have a larger impact than reductions of budget deficits and so too does inflation. 
These results yield also J-, W- or inverted N-curves. These results also hold if a risk variable 
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is constructed from a TARCH model for the growth rate of the exchange rate. When the effect 
of devaluations is adjusted for that of risk, devaluations still have a stronger impact on the 
trade balance then reductions of deficits. US growth remains having the strongest impact. 
As these results are based on too low a number of observations – although compatible 
with the results for yearly data – we use a polynomial distributed lag in order to estimate a 
lower number of parameters. We find J- or W-curves for Brazil, implying that the effect of 
devaluations is stretched out over more than two years, whereas that of budget deficit 
reductions vanishes after two month. This holds even if a measure of exchange rate risk is 
included in the regressions. The impact of devaluations on the trade balance is much stronger 
now than that of budget deficit reductions.  
In the last update, though, using data also for the year 2005, the central variables in the 
discussion change there sign. Neither devaluations nor cuts in budget deficits would then have 
the desired impact on the trade balance. Cutting budget deficits would decrease interest rates, 
encourage investments, imports of investment goods and thereby increase the trade deficit. 
Devaluations would suffer from low elasticities of the trade balance. Both aspects have been 
discussed since long in the developing country literature. Since October 2002 and even more 
so since June 2004 Brazil has shifted to a policy leading to appreciations, which may have 
induced the shift in signs in our regressions, perhaps together with other events.  
Moreover, we show that devaluations have no impact on GDP inflation in the period 
considered including a period of hyperinflation once the regressions are run for stationary 
variables. However, the literature for non-hyperinflation periods is clearly in favour of 
exchange rate pass through and we find it too for the consumer price inflation. Even though 
devaluations pass through to inflation, the recent inflation targeting literature is in favour of 
flexible exchange rates. Together with our major result obtained in several versions that 
devaluations have a stronger impact on the trade balance than budget deficit reductions, we 
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interpret these results as supportive for Stiglitz’ view that devaluations should be allowed for 
rather than being avoided by selling foreign exchange reserves when debt payments require 
increased trade surpluses and the whole burden should not be shifted to budget deficits. 
However, if the change in results as obtained when adding data for the last year are correct, 
both these policies will not improve the trade balance. Therefore future research should focus 
on imported inputs, elasticities and stability tests.    
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Table 1:  
Regressions for the trade surplus as % of GDP   
Regression 1 2(b) 3 4(b) 5(b) 
Variable           
            
constant -0.51 0.24 7.62 -0.34 -1.33 
  -(0.47) (0.59) (1.96) -(0.47) -(2.05) 
bdgdp -0.27 -0.20 -0.44 -0.21 -0.39 
  -(3.51) -(2.90) -(4.35) -(1.93) -(5.22) 
D(lne) - - 2.61 2.24 2.62 
      (4.23) (1.32) (2.08) 
inflat. % ch. - - -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
      -(4.83) -(2.42) -(4.27) 
GDP Braz - - -5E-11 -4E-11 -4E-11 
      -(2.04) -(1.91) -(3.12) 
GDP world - - 8.4E-13 1.4E-12 2.7E-12 
      (1.66) (0.72) (1.99) 
others - (a) -0.37- - (c) -1.24 
    -(1.64)     -(4.24) 
Adjusted R-sq.  0.19 0.07 0.76 0.28 0.61 
S.E. of regression 2.37 1.78 1.28 1.58 1.15 
Sum sq. resid 84.4 38.1 18.1 22.4 10.7 
Log likelihood -37.7 -28.3 -24.7 -24.3 -18.7 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.65 1.75 2.01 1.85 2.28 
Akaike crit. 4.68 4.17 3.61 4.04 3.43 
Schwarz crit 4.77 4.31 3.90 4.32 3.76 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.16 0.02 
BG F-Prob.(no.of lags) - - 0.625 (2) 0.74 (3) 0.5(1) 
Reset F-Prob(no.fit it.) - - 0.63 (1) 0.73 (4) 0.16 (2) 
Included obs.  17 15 17 15 15 
t-values in parantheses      
(a) RESIDregr1(-1)    
(b) first differences of indicated variables 
(c) Residregr4(-1)    
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Table 2 Accounting for the trade surplus    
Regression 3        
Variab.      tradsurp C BDGDP dlne Inflation GDPBraz GDPW   
coefficient 1.00 7.6 -0.44 2.61 0.00 0.00 0.00   
av. variable 1.47 1.0 -7.35 1.47 667.60 5.95E+11 2.46E+13   
coeff*av.var 1.47 7.6 3.21 3.84 -1.96 -31.84 20.62   
% of LHS 1.00 5.2 2.18 2.61 -1.33 -21.64 14.01   
  
Regression 4                 
Variab.     d(tradsurp) C D(BDGDP) D(d(lne)) D(INFLA) D(GDPBRAZ) D(GDPW)   
coefficient 1.00 -0.3 -0.21 2.24 0.00 0.00 0.00   
av. variable 0.11 1.0 -0.27 0.15 143.23 1.06E+10 6.47E+11   
coeff*av.var 0.11 -0.3 0.06 0.35 -0.32 -0.47 0.91   
% of LHS 1.00 -3.2 0.54 3.22 -2.98 -4.39 8.44   
 
Regression 5                
Variab.     d(tradsurp)       C      D(BDGDP) D(d(lne)) D(INFLA) D(GDPBRAZ) D(GDPW),RESE4(-1) 
coefficient 1.00 -1.3 -0.39 2.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.24 
av. variable 0.11 1.0 -0.27 0.15 143.23 1.06E+10 6.47E+11,1.4E-12 
coeff*av.var 0.11 -1.3 0.10 0.40 -0.47 -0.38 1.77 0.00 
% of LHS 1.00 -12.3 0.98 3.77 -4.35 -3.58 16.52 0.00 
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Table 3a      
Variable 
Availabil
ity 
Month. 
Data 
Integration
 Order,b)     
  from to     
trade def/GDP 
Jan 
1990 Apr 2004 I(0)   
budgdef/GDP 
Jan 
1998 Apr 2004 I(0)   
dlne 
Aug 
1994 May 2004 I(0)   
inflat.%ch.(a) 
Jan 
1994 May 2004 I(0),0   
GDP Brazil, % change 
Feb 
1990 Apr 2004 I(0),0   
Indust. Product. 
Index,%change 
Jan 
1991 
11/03-
01/04 I(1)(d)   
      
Table 3b marginal significance levels, (c)  
Variable ADF DF-GLS PP ERS-PO 
Ng-
Perron 
trade def/GDP 0.135 <5%,c, 0.0842,c >5%,c <5% 
budgdef/GDP 
0.385,  
0.0018,  
0.086,c  
>>10%,
<1%, 
<5%,c 
0, c  
(and c,t) 
>>10%, 
<1%, 
<10%,c 
>10%, 
<1%, 
<10% 
dlne 0,c         
inflat.%ch.(a) 0 <1%,c 0,c 
<1%, 
<5%,(d) 1%
GDP Brazil, % change 
0.0071, 
0, >10% 0
>10%, 
<1%, 
>10% 
>>10%, 
<1%, 
>>10% 
Indust. Product. 
Index,%change 
<5.5%, 
(e)         
 
 
(a) Whole Sale Price Index Global Supply Industry (WPIGSI) and Agriculture 
(WPIGSA) 
(b) 'c' indicates a constant,  't' a time trend in some of the unit root tests.  
(c) Several values are given if the selection of the number of lagged first differences 
differs depending on the use of the standard criteria AIC, SIC, HQ. 
(d) if Spectral est.meth. is 'AR spectral, GLS detrended'; in other cases eviews' 
defaults are used.  
(e) The log of the industrial production index has no unit root for France and Japan. 
As ADF gives clear results we did not use the other tests. 
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Table 4 Trade deficit/GDP regression with monthly data  
    
                           
Regression 1 
 Regression 
2 
    
Variable Coefficient t-Stat t-
Prob.
Coeff. t-Statistic t-Prob. 
C 0.34 2.15 0.05 0.42 1.18 0.26 
DLNE 0.10 8.31 0.00 0.10 7.20 0.00 
DLNE(-1) -0.09 -6.95 0.00 -0.10 -7.27 0.00 
DLNE(-2) -0.03 -2.32 0.04 -0.04 -1.80 0.10 
DLNE(-3) 0.23 10.70 0.00 0.24 9.48 0.00 
DLNE(-4) -0.12 -10.90 0.00 -0.13 -10.38 0.00 
DLNE(-5) -0.14 -6.32 0.00 -0.15 -5.64 0.00 
D(LNE(-6) - - - 0.01 0.28 0.78 
DLNE(-7) -0.36 -7.47 0.00 -0.37 -4.30 0.00 
DLNE(-8) 0.09 3.45 0.00 0.10 1.15 0.27 
DLNE(-9) -0.32 -7.66 0.00 -0.33 -4.21 0.00 
DLNE(-10) 0.12 4.16 0.00 0.14 2.26 0.05 
DLNE(-11) -0.27 -7.11 0.00 -0.30 -7.26 0.00 
DLNE(-12) 0.18 5.45 0.00 0.25 4.42 0.00 
DLNE(-13) -0.26 -8.66 0.00 -0.33 -4.48 0.00 
D(LNE(-14) - - - 0.07 1.28 0.23 
DLNE(-15) -0.06 -2.48 0.03 -0.11 -2.25 0.05 
DLNE(-16) -0.08 -3.23 0.01 -0.04 -1.31 0.22 
DLNE(-17) -0.10 -2.86 0.01 -0.12 -3.24 0.01 
DLNE(-18) 0.09 3.00 0.01 0.10 1.89 0.08 
DLNE(-19) -0.36 -9.78 0.00 -0.38 -6.96 0.00 
DLNE(-20) 0.13 5.18 0.00 0.15 3.62 0.00 
DLNE(-21) -0.15 -9.01 0.00 -0.17 -5.17 0.00 
DLNE(-22) -0.21 -6.38 0.00 -0.19 -4.99 0.00 
d(LNE(-23) - - - -0.04 -0.58 0.57 
DLNE(-24) -0.15 -6.14 0.00 -0.11 -2.12 0.06 
DLNE(-25) -0.22 -9.05 0.00 -0.26 -5.14 0.00 
D(LNE(-26) - - - 0.03 1.88 0.09 
TDGDP(-1) 0.54 13.37 0.00 0.54 8.93 0.00 
BDGDP(-2) 0.11 3.93 0.00 0.12 5.43 0.00 
DLNGDP 0.06 6.86 0.00 0.06 5.13 0.00 
TIMESQ 0.00 12.64 0.00 0.00 7.67 0.00 
D(LNUSA(-4)) -1.71 -8.35 0.00 -1.84 -7.78 0.00 
LNFRA(-3) 0.61 5.01 0.00 0.70 5.17 0.00 
D(LNUSA(-3)) -0.30 -1.90 0.08 -0.38 -1.61 0.14 
D(LNGER(-1)) 0.47 5.01 0.00 0.48 4.72 0.00 
D(LNUK(-3)) 0.25 2.40 0.03 0.34 2.06 0.06 
D(LNUSA(-1)) -0.81 -6.47 0.00 -0.90 -5.43 0.00 
D(LNUK(-1)) -0.60 -7.48 0.00 -0.57 -3.86 0.00 
D(LNJAP(-1)) 0.35 8.26 0.00 0.40 6.80 0.00 
D(LNGER(-2)) 1.06 6.80 0.00 1.13 6.00 0.00 
D(LNUSA(-2)) -1.09 -4.74 0.00 -1.23 -3.94 0.00 
LNFRA(-2) -0.69 -5.83 0.00 -0.80 -6.47 0.00 
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D(LNGER(-3)) 0.52 5.10 0.00 0.52 4.49 0.00 
D(LNJAP(-4)) 0.31 5.08 0.00 0.31 4.89 0.00 
D(LNCAN(-2)) 0.29 2.79 0.01 0.36 3.06 0.01 
D(LNCAN(-3)) 0.65 7.15 0.00 0.72 4.97 0.00 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 1.02 9.22 0.00 1.07 11.37 0.00 
WPIGSA(-2) 0.00 -3.34 0.00 0.00 -2.62 0.02 
WPIGSA 0.00 3.51 0.00 0.00 2.71 0.02 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.01 14.63 0.00 0.01 5.42 0.00 
WPIGSI(-6) 0.00 2.95 0.01 0.00 1.80 0.10 
Jarq.-Bera 
Prob. 
0.55               0.19  
Breusch-Godfr. 
F-prob. 
0.13               0.17  
Ramsey 
RESET 
0.34      0.14  
One-Step Forc. 
Test(a) 
2      1  
N-Step Forc. 
Test(a) 
0      0  
R2 adj. 0.98      0.97  
AIC -8.70      -8.76  
SIC -7.07      -6.99  
HQ -      -8.06  
DW 2.44      2.18  
see 0.00      0.00  
ssr 0.00      0.00  
No. of 
observations 
63      63  
 
(a) number of observations which cast doubt on the assumption of parameter 
constancy 
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Table 5 Accounting for the trade deficit/GDP 
(a) Regression 1 of Table 4  
Variable aver. coeff av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 0.42 0.42 56.20 
dlne 0.01 -1.97 -0.02 -3.30 
bdgdp 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.78 
tdgdp(-1) 0.01 0.54 0.00 0.47 
dlngdp -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.04 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.20 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.08 
others(a)   -55.23 
     
(b) Regression 2 of Table 4  
Variable aver. coeff av.*coeff  percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 0.34 0.34 45.25 
dlne 0.01 -1.98 -0.02 -3.33 
bdgdp 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.73 
tdgdp(-1) 0.01 0.54 0.00 0.46 
dlngdp -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.04 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.21 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.05 
others(a)   -44.23 
     
(a) timesq and index of industrial production 
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Table 6 : TARCH(1) estimate of exchange rate risk  
Dependent Variable: D(LNE)   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) –Normal error distribution   
Sample(adjusted): 1994:10 2003:12  
Included observations: 111 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 144 iterations  
Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance 
Variance backcast: ON   
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Stat.     Prob.   
     
C  0.009 0.003 3.067 0.002 
D(LNE(-1))  0.540 0.093 5.820 0.000 
D(LNE(-2))  -0.251 0.090 -2.803 0.005 
        Variance Equation  
C  0.001 0.001 1.534 0.125 
ARCH(1)  0.640 0.336 1.906 0.057 
(RESID<0)*ARCH(1) -0.470 0.277 -1.697 0.090 
R-squared  0.231     Mean dependent var 0.011 
Adjusted R-squared 0.194     S.D. dependent var 0.045 
S.E. of regression  0.041     Akaike info criterion -3.787 
Sum squared resid 0.173     Schwarz criterion -3.641 
Log likelihood  216.193     F-statistic  6.297 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.999     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
 
 
 
Table 6b: TARCH(1) estimate of exchange rate risk 
Dependent Variable: DLNE   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Generalized error distribution (GED) 
Sample (adjusted): 1994M10 2005M04   
Included observations: 127 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 26 iterations  
Variance backcast: ON    
GARCH = C(4) + C(5)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C  0.003  0.000 36.863 0.000 
DLNE(-1)  0.638  0.017 37.180 0.000 
DLNE(-2)  -0.082  0.011 -7.351    0.000 
 Variance Equation   
C  1.4E-06  1.7E-06 8.3E-01 4.1E-01 
RESID(-1)^2  1.8E+01 4. 9E+00 3.6E+00 3.0E-04 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0)-1.2E+01 5.8E+00 -2.0E+00 4.5E-02 
GED PARAMETER 5.8E-01  7.5E-02 7.7E+00 0.0E+00 
R-squared  0.129     Mean dependent var 0.009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085     S.D. dependent var 0.044 
S.E. of regression  0.042     Akaike info criterion -5.093 
Sum squared resid  0.212     Schwarz criterion -4.936 
Log likelihood  330.415       F-statistic  2.952 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.151     Prob(F-statistic) 0.010 
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Table 7 Trade deficit/GDP regression with monthly data 
Dependent Variable: TDGDP    
Method: Least Squares    
Sample(adjusted): 1998:03 2003:05   
Included observations: 63 after adjusting endpoints  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.936 0.141 -6.653 0.000 
DLNE 0.098 0.017 5.868 0.000 
DLNE(-1) -0.105 0.013 -7.891 0.000 
DLNE(-3) 0.178 0.016 11.146 0.000 
DLNE(-4) -0.138 0.014 -10.119 0.000 
DLNE(-7) -0.399 0.031 -12.767 0.000 
DLNE(-9) -0.295 0.023 -12.653 0.000 
DLNE(-11) -0.219 0.021 -10.611 0.000 
DLNE(-12) 0.103 0.026 3.931 0.001 
DLNE(-13) -0.329 0.028 -11.799 0.000 
DLNE(-15) -0.169 0.024 -7.096 0.000 
DLNE(-16) -0.045 0.014 -3.126 0.006 
DLNE(-17) -0.183 0.020 -9.145 0.000 
DLNE(-19) -0.249 0.015 -16.564 0.000 
DLNE(-21) -0.187 0.017 -10.944 0.000 
DLNE(-22) -0.102 0.018 -5.568 0.000 
DLNE(-23) -0.204 0.032 -6.415 0.000 
DLNE(-24) -0.065 0.022 -2.990 0.008 
DLNE(-25) -0.276 0.025 -11.184 0.000 
DLNE(-26) -0.033 0.016 -2.095 0.052 
TDGDP(-1) 0.612 0.053 11.482 0.000 
BDGDP(-2) 0.091 0.017 5.232 0.000 
DLNGDP 0.041 0.011 3.836 0.001 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.011 0.001 11.607 0.000 
TIMESQ 0.000 0.000 12.110 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-4)) -0.811 0.110 -7.382 0.000 
LNFRA(-3) 1.035 0.154 6.745 0.000 
WPIGSI(-6) 0.006 0.001 5.046 0.000 
D(LNGER(-1)) 0.480 0.058 8.242 0.000 
D(LNUK(-3)) 0.141 0.068 2.055 0.056 
D(LNUSA(-1)) -0.580 0.089 -6.507 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-1)) 0.242 0.040 6.125 0.000 
D(LNGER(-2)) 1.014 0.086 11.814 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-2)) -0.662 0.110 -6.032 0.000 
LNFRA(-2) -0.836 0.147 -5.696 0.000 
D(LNGER(-3)) 0.567 0.070 8.132 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-4)) 0.312 0.025 12.667 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-2)) 0.351 0.160 2.189 0.043 
D(LNCAN(-3)) 0.758 0.116 6.517 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 0.866 0.086 10.044 0.000 
WPIGSA(-2) -0.002 0.000 -9.655 0.000 
DLNEFSIGMA 1.031 0.387 2.665 0.016 
DLNEFSIGMA(-4) -1.922 0.240 -8.000 0.000 
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DLNEFSIGMA(-5) -2.974 0.326 -9.129 0.000 
DLNEFSIGMA(-6) 0.812 0.345 2.354 0.031 
DLNEFSIGMA(-7) 2.789 0.274 10.197 0.000 
Jarq.-Bera Prob. 0.870    
Breusch-Godfr. F-prob. .54   b)    
Ramsey RESET  .141  c)    
One-Step Forc. Test(a) 5.000    
N-Step Forc. Test(a) 9.000    
R2 adj. 0.982    
AIC -8.946    
SIC -7.381    
HQ -    
DW 2.224    
see 0.003    
ssr 0.000    
No. of observations 63    
(a) number of observations which cast doubt on the assumption of parameter 
constancy 
b) for one lag; it is larger when more lags are used 
c) values get larger when more fitted terms are added 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  Accounting for the trade deficit/GDP 
(a) Regression 1 of Table   
Variable aver. coeff av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.007 1.000 0.007 1.000 
const 1.000 -0.936 -0.936 -125.095 
dlne 0.013 -2.618 -0.033 -4.388 
bdgdp(-2) 0.050 0.091 0.005 0.608 
tdgdp(-1) 0.006 0.612 0.004 0.529 
dlngdp -0.006 0.041 0.000 -0.031 
wpigsi 1.153 0.017 0.020 2.678 
wpigsa 1.585 -0.002 -0.004 -0.524 
risk(b) 0.002 -0.265 -0.001 -0.067 
others(a)    127.290 
     
(a) timesq and index of industrial production  
(b) the average is taken over the regression period 
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Table 9      
Dependent Variable: TDGDP    
Method: Least Squares    
Sample(adjusted): 1998:03 2003:06   
Included observations: 64 after adjusting endpoints  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Errort-Stat. Prob.   
      
C -0.811  0.199 -4.077 0.000 
TDGDP(-1) 0.757  0.046 16.343 0.000 
BDGDP(-2) 0.113  0.028 4.003 0.000 
DLNGDP 0.024  0.009 2.526 0.016 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.007  0.002 4.051 0.000 
TIMESQ 0.000  0.000 3.726 0.001 
LNFRA(-3) 0.170  0.042 4.073 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-2)) 0.266  0.115 2.322 0.025 
DLNEFSIGMA 0.859  0.350 2.452 0.019 
DLNEFSIGMA(-5) 0.753  0.365 2.066 0.045 
DLNEFSIGMA(-6) 0.838  0.324 2.584 0.013 
DLNEFSIGMA(-7) 1.238  0.332 3.733 0.001 
PDL01 -0.036  0.014 -2.605 0.013 
PDL02 0.000  0.004 0.009 0.993 
PDL03 0.000  0.002 -0.250 0.804 
PDL04 0.001  0.000 2.735 0.009 
PDL05 -0.000102 9.26E-05 -1.106 0.275 
PDL06 -3.17E-05 9.37E-06 -3.385 0.002 
PDL07 3.40E-06  1.82E-06 1.870 0.069 
PDL08 3.27E-07  9.21E-08 3.544 0.001 
PDL09 -3.35E-08 1.47E-08 -2.278 0.028 
PDL010 -1.06E-09 2.97E-10 -3.566 0.001 
PDL011 1.04E-10  4.14E-11 2.521 0.016 
      
R-squared  0.923 Mean dependent var 0.008 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881 S.D. dependent var 0.020 
S.E. of regression 0.007 Akaike info criterion -6.864 
Sum squared resid 0.002 Schwarz criterion  -6.089 
Log likelihood  242.660 F-statistic  22.228 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.367 Prob(F-statistic)  0 
      
Lag Distribution of DLNE i Coefficient  Std. Error  T-Statistic 
      
             .   *| 0 0.032 0.019 1.717 
         *   .    | 1 -0.039 0.017 -2.333 
             .  * | 2 0.022 0.011 2.027 
             .  * | 3 0.027 0.011 2.491 
           * .    | 4 -0.023 0.007 -3.340 
     *       .    | 5 -0.080 0.016 -5.047 
 *           .    | 6 -0.111 0.022 -5.081 
 *           .    | 7 -0.111 0.022 -4.939 
    *        .    | 8 -0.089 0.020 -4.497 
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      *      .    | 9 -0.064 0.017 -3.860 
        *    .    | 10 -0.045 0.014 -3.304 
         *   .    | 11 -0.037 0.013 -2.859 
          *  .    | 12 -0.036 0.014 -2.605 
          *  .    | 13 -0.035 0.013 -2.659 
          *  .    | 14 -0.032 0.011 -2.955 
          *  .    | 15 -0.027 0.008 -3.237 
           * .    | 16 -0.025 0.008 -3.114 
          *  .    | 17 -0.029 0.009 -3.282 
         *   .    | 18 -0.041 0.011 -3.844 
       *     .    | 19 -0.055 0.013 -4.369 
       *     .    | 20 -0.063 0.013 -4.874 
       *     .    | 21 -0.058 0.013 -4.590 
        *    .    | 22 -0.046 0.014 -3.356 
         *   .    | 23 -0.043 0.013 -3.330 
       *     .    | 24 -0.060 0.022 -2.722 
          *  .    | 25 -0.031 0.020 -1.542 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 Accounting for the trade deficit/GDP 
 Regression 1 of pdl    
Variable  aver.  coeff av.*coeff  percent 
tdgdp 0.007 1.000 0.007 1.000 
const 1.000 -0.811 -0.811 -108.385 
dlne 0.013 -1.098 -0.014 -1.840 
bdgdp(-2)0.050 0.113 0.006 0.754 
tdgdp(-1) 0.006 0.757 0.005 0.655 
dlngdp -0.006 0.024 0.000 -0.018 
wpigsi 1.153 0.007 0.009 1.144 
wpigsa 1.585 0.000 0.000 0.000 
risk (b) 0.002 3.688 0.007 0.928 
others (a)   107.763 
(a) timesq and index of industrial production     
b) the average is taken over the regression period     
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Table 11 
Dependent Variable: TDGDP,    
Method: Least Squares      
Sample(adjusted): 1998:02 2005:02   
Included observations: 85 after adjusting endpoints  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
C 1.693  0.285 5.929 0.000 
TDGDP(-1) 0.376  0.100 3.754 0.000 
BDGDP(-1) -0.133  0.028 -4.713 0.000 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.005  0.001 3.911 0.000 
TIMESQ 0.000  0.000 6.697 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-1)) -0.659  0.133 -4.959 0.000 
D(LNGER(-1)) 0.124  0.059 2.110 0.039 
D(LNUK(-3)) -0.155  0.057 -2.715 0.009 
LNFRA(-2) -0.067  0.017 -4.084 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-5)) 0.070  0.025 2.805 0.007 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 0.165  0.034 4.817 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-5)) 0.089  0.045 1.965 0.054 
LNFRA(-1) -0.177  0.030 -5.821 0.000 
LNFRA(-4) -0.136  0.029 -4.702 0.000 
DLNEFSIGMA2(-1) -0.017 0.007 -2.443 0.018 
DLNEFSIGMA2(-5) -0.017 0.009 -1.790 0.079 
DLNEFSIGMA2(-8) -0.019 0.008 -2.488 0.016 
PDL01 0.030  0.011 2.835 0.006 
PDL02 -0.006  0.004 -1.583 0.119 
PDL03 -0.003  0.001 -2.985 0.004 
PDL04 0.001  0.000 3.142 0.003 
PDL05 0.000  0.000 2.702 0.009 
PDL06 0.000  0.000 -3.406 0.001 
PDL07 0.000  0.000 -2.305 0.025 
PDL08 0.000  0.000 3.274 0.002 
PDL09 0.000  0.000 1.994 0.051 
PDL010 0.000  0.000 -3.067 0.003 
R-squared 0.947  Mean dependent var 0.019 
Adjusted R-squared 0.923 S.D. dependent var 0.027 
S.E. of regr.             0.007  Akaike info crit. -6.723 
Sum squared resid 0.003  Schwarz criterion -5.947 
Log likelihood 312.709 F-statistic  39.907 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.018  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
  
Lag Distribution of DLNE i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic    
       . *        | 0 0.009 0.021 0.408 
       .   *      | 1 0.018 0.014 1.286 
       .         *| 2 0.050 0.013 3.963 
       .        * | 3 0.047 0.011 4.186 
       .   *      | 4 0.020 0.008 2.459 
      *.          | 5 -0.006 0.008 -0.840 
    *  .          | 6 -0.018 0.009 -1.851 
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     * .          | 7 -0.011 0.010 -1.073 
       . *        | 8 0.006 0.010 0.575 
       .    *     | 9 0.023 0.011 2.022 
       .     *    | 10 0.031 0.011 2.712 
       .     *    | 11 0.030 0.011 2.835 
       .    *     | 12 0.022 0.009 2.442 
       .  *       | 13 0.013 0.008 1.629 
       . *        | 14 0.010 0.008 1.145 
       .  *       | 15 0.012 0.009 1.404 
       .   *      | 16 0.018 0.009 2.045 
       .   *      | 17 0.020 0.009 2.321 
       .  *       | 18 0.015 0.009 1.627 
       .*         | 19 0.006 0.011 0.543 
       .*         | 20 0.002 0.010 0.201 
       .   *      | 21 0.017 0.015 1.087 
       .      *   | 22 0.036 0.025 1.464 
 *     .          | 23 -0.032 0.016 -2.014 
      
Sum of Lags   0.337 0.144 2.334  
 
 
Table 12      
Dependent Variable: TDGDP   
Method: Least Squares      
Sample(adjusted): 1995:10 2005:03   
Included observations: 114 after adjusting endpoints 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)  
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
    C 8.51E-01  1.83E-01 4.645 0.000 
TDGDP(-1) 2.70E-01  1.35E-01 2.006 0.048 
WPIGSI(-5) 4.73E-03  1.24E-03 3.807 0.000 
TIMESQ 2.90E-06  5.13E-07 5.648 0.000 
LNFRA(-3) -8.18E-02  2.61E-02 -3.130 0.002 
D(LNUSA(-3)) -2.13E-01  1.27E-01 -1.673 0.098 
D(LNGER(-1)) 1.31E-01  7.70E-02 1.706 0.092 
D(LNUK(-1)) -2.08E-01  4.49E-02 -4.641 0.000 
D(LNGER(-2)) 1.26E-01  7.01E-02 1.797 0.076 
LNFRA(-2) -1.15E-01  2.54E-02 -4.523 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-4)) -9.11E-02  2.18E-02 -4.170 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 1.03E-01  3.09E-02 3.318 0.001 
PDL01 6.15E-03  7.57E-03 0.812 0.419 
PDL02 -2.93E-03  3.96E-03 -0.739 0.462 
PDL03 -1.13E-03  6.12E-04 -1.842 0.069 
PDL04 5.91E-04  2.27E-04 2.603 0.011 
PDL05 -3.34E-05  3.38E-05 -0.986 0.327 
PDL06 -1.42E-05  4.60E-06 -3.079 0.003 
PDL07 1.71E-06  8.02E-07 2.131 0.036 
PDL08 8.00E-08  3.63E-08 2.202 0.030 
PDL09 -1.84E-08  7.38E-09 -2.487 0.015 
PDL010 2.51E-10  2.74E-10 0.917 0.362 
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PDL011 5.90E-11  2.26E-11 2.610 0.011 
PDL012 -2.21E-12  1.07E-12 -2.059 0.043 
PDL013 1.19E-03  2.48E-03 0.480 0.632 
PDL014 -2.54E-03  1.53E-03 -1.666 0.099 
PDL015 -5.64E-06  1.31E-04 -0.043 0.966 
PDL016 1.10E-04  6.33E-05 1.744 0.085 
R-squared 0.908  Mean dependent var 0.013 
Adjusted R-squared 0.879  S.D. dependent var 0.026 
S.E. of regression 0.009  Akaike info criterion -6.341 
Sum squared resid 0.007  Schwarz criterion -5.669 
Log likelihood 389.441  F-statistic  31.392 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.239  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
      
      Lag Distribution of DLNE i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
      
         .     *  | 0 0.039 0.019 1.994 
         . *      | 1 0.013 0.014 0.949 
         .       *| 2 0.049 0.020 2.409 
         .      * | 3 0.042 0.019 2.154 
         .*       | 4 0.004 0.012 0.294 
    *    .        | 5 -0.033 0.012 -2.825 
 *       .        | 6 -0.049 0.015 -3.311 
  *      .        | 7 -0.044 0.016 -2.761 
     *   .        | 8 -0.028 0.016 -1.693 
        *.        | 9 -0.009 0.016 -0.595 
         .*       | 10 0.003 0.014 0.194 
         .*       | 11 0.007 0.011 0.650 
         .*       | 12 0.006 0.008 0.812 
         *        | 13 0.003 0.004 0.633 
         *        | 14 0.000 0.002 -0.202 
         *        | 15 -0.002 0.001 -2.363 
         *        | 16 -0.002 0.001 -2.690 
         *        | 17 -0.001 0.001 -2.204 
         *        | 18 -0.001 0.001 -1.987 
         *        | 19 -0.001 0.001 -2.330 
         *        | 20 -0.002 0.001 -2.814 
         *        | 21 -0.001 0.001 -2.162 
         *        | 22 -0.001 0.000 -1.104 
         *        | 23 0.000 0.001 -0.505 
         *        | 24 0.000 0.000 -0.892 
         *        | 25 -0.001 0.000 -3.431 
      
 Sum of Lags -0.010 0.125 -0.083 
      Lag Distribution of  
DLNEFSIGMA2 i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
      
 *      .         | 0 -0.008 0.007 -1.050 
        *         | 1 0.000 0.004 -0.008 
        .   *     | 2 0.004 0.004 1.183 
        .    *    | 3 0.006 0.004 1.515 
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        .    *    | 4 0.005 0.004 1.498 
        .  *      | 5 0.004 0.003 1.222 
        .*        | 6 0.001 0.002 0.480 
       *.         | 7 -0.001 0.003 -0.475 
     *  .         | 8 -0.003 0.003 -0.990 
     *  .         | 9 -0.004 0.003 -1.126 
      * .         | 10 -0.002 0.002 -0.828 
        . *       | 11 0.002 0.002 0.958 
        .        *| 12 0.010 0.006 1.672 
      
 Sum of Lags 0.014 0.022 0.660 
 
Table 13 Regressions for inflation    
Regression gr.GDP 
defl.  
gr.GDPdefl.
(a) 
gr.CPI gr.CPI 
(a) 
gr.CPI(b) 
constant 304.19 93.86 0.53 0.05 -0.05 
 (2.54) (1.98) (5.03) (1.30) -(0.74) 
INFL(-1) -0.69 -0.63 - - - 
 -(3.77) -(6.43)    
M2GROWTH 0.45 0.86 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
 (4.48) (4.01) (6.33) (10.21) (5.95) 
M2GR(-1) 0.72 1.14 - - - 
 (4.87) (24.55)    
M2GR(-2) 1.53 1.65 - - - 
 (4.78) (8.63)    
dlne(-1) - - 0.18 0.10 - 
   (2.77) (2.20)  
dlne(-2) -654.89 -279.27 0.22 0.20 - 
 -(3.79) -(2.25) (3.13) (3.82)  
dlne(-3) - - -0.25 -0.42 -0.62 
   -(5.39) -(5.79) -(8.39) 
Bdgdp - - -0.02 - - 
   -(2.08)   
time - -34.94 - -  
-      
  -(5.92)    
Adjusted R-
squared, 0.93 
0.91 0.95 0.95 0.86  
S.E. of regr. 219.66 223.42 0.12 0.12 0.23 
Sum squa. resid  482521.6 349430.6 0.13 0.14 0.52 
Log likelihood -105.22 -90.74 14.09 12.49 2.42 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.80 2.89 2.07 2.57 1.71 
    Akaike ic 13.90 13.96 -1.08 -1.07 0.09 
    Schwarz c 14.19 14.28 -0.79 -0.84 0.22 
    F-statistic 42.56 24.06 52.70 60.62 36.58 
No. of Obs. 16 14 15 14 13 
t-values in parantheses 
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Table 14 Accounting for inflation  
a) Level of GDP inflation   
Variable coeff var.aver.coeff*aver. % of infl*100 
infl 1.00 709.00 709.00 1.00 
Intercept 304.19 1.00 304.19 0.43 
M2growth 0.45 758.44 344.83 0.49 
M2gr(-1) 0.72 686.87 492.52 0.69 
M2gr(-2) 1.53 507.42 778.74 1.10 
Infl(-1) -0.69 573.17 -395.01 -0.56 
d(lne(-2)) -654.9  1.31 -860.00 -1.21 
     
b) level of CPI inflation   
Variable coeff var.aver.coeff*aver. %of infla*100 
CPIinfl 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.00 
Intercept 0.53 1.00 0.53 0.44 
M2growth 0.00 804.90 0.32 0.27 
BDGDP -0.02 -7.65 0.12 0.10 
dlne(-1) 0.18 1.47 0.27 0.22 
d(lne(-2)) 0.22 1.31 0.29 0.24 
d(lne(-3)) -0.25 1.34 -0.33 -0.28 
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Figure 1: Coefficients of the exchange rate variables   
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Figure 2: Variants of J-curves for monthly devaluations    
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Figure 3: Forecast from the TARCH model with Gaussian Error Distribution 
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Figure 4:  
Forecast from the updated TARCH model with Generalized Error Distribution 
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Figure 5 
Natural log of exchange rate for Brazil since October 2002
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Appendix       
Table 4B Trade deficit/GDP regression with monthly data 
 Regression1  Regression 2  
Variable Coeff. t-Stat. t-Prob. Coeff. t-Stat. t-Prob. 
C 1.845 2.903 0.012 1.630 3.806 0.001 
DLNE 0.097 5.903 0.000 0.093 5.483 0.000 
DLNE(-1) -0.081 -3.529 0.004 -0.087 -4.778 0.000 
DLNE(-2) -0.028 -1.141 0.274           -         -         - 
DLNE(-3) 0.217 5.828 0.000 0.188 8.140 0.000 
DLNE(-4) -0.091 -8.690 0.000 -0.081 -6.851 0.000 
DLNE(-5) -0.143 -4.743 0.000 -0.129 -5.516 0.000 
DLNE(-6) 0.044 0.750 0.466          -          -         - 
DLNE(-7) -0.385 -4.452 0.001 -0.318 -12.479 0.000 
DLNE(-8) 0.149 1.880 0.083 0.098 4.202 0.001 
DLNE(-9) -0.327 -4.856 0.000 -0.283 -8.457 0.000 
DLNE(-10) 0.120 2.262 0.042 0.112 3.366 0.003 
DLNE(-11) -0.226 -3.230 0.007 -0.245 -4.250 0.000 
DLNE(-12) 0.152 1.907 0.079 0.185 3.530 0.002 
DLNE(-13) -0.139 -1.731 0.107 -0.180 -4.043 0.001 
DLNE(-14) -0.045 -0.762 0.460          -         -        - 
DLNE(-15) 0.030 0.630 0.540          -         -        - 
DLNE(-16) -0.100 -2.512 0.026 -0.077 -2.825 0.011 
DLNE(-17) -0.055 -1.752 0.103 -0.057 -4.084 0.001 
DLNE(-18) 0.113 2.761 0.016 0.093 3.854 0.001 
DLNE(-19) -0.362 -7.283 0.000 -0.328 -9.531 0.000 
DLNE(-20) 0.162 3.295 0.006 0.153 4.061 0.001 
DLNE(-21) -0.121 -3.712 0.003 -0.148 -6.479 0.000 
DLNE(-22) -0.221 -4.136 0.001 -0.150 -6.268 0.000 
DLNE(-23) 0.086 1.266 0.228           -          -        - 
DLNE(-24) -0.189 -3.008 0.010 -0.121 -8.005 0.000 
DLNE(-25) -0.161 -4.348 0.001 -0.176 -7.892 0.000 
DLNE(-26) -0.007 -0.387 0.705          -         -         - 
TDGDP(-1) 0.342 2.351 0.035 0.320 2.278 0.035 
BDGDP(-2) 0.073 3.469 0.004 0.078 3.162 0.005 
DLNGDP 0.063 5.941 0.000 0.060 5.734 0.000 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.007 3.279 0.006 0.008 6.749 0.000 
TIMESQ 0.000 6.762 0.000 0.000 8.457 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-4)) -1.710 -4.448 0.001 -1.518 -4.033 0.001 
WPIGSI(-6) 0.007 2.585 0.023 0.005 3.763 0.001 
TIME 0.000 1.865 0.085 0.000 2.158 0.044 
D(LNGER(-1)) 0.425 4.817 0.000 0.379 5.777 0.000 
D(LNUK(-3)) 0.221 1.802 0.095 0.202 2.241 0.037 
D(LNUSA(-1)) -0.821 -3.397 0.005 -0.738 -4.003 0.001 
D(LNUK(-1)) -0.708 -5.743 0.000 -0.541 -9.989 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-1)) 0.266 4.622 0.001 0.251 4.989 0.000 
D(LNGER(-2)) 0.897 7.065 0.000 0.816 6.124 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-2)) -1.005 -3.853 0.002 -0.864 -6.035 0.000 
LNFRA(-2) -0.405 -2.885 0.013 -0.360 -3.752 0.001 
D(LNGER(-3)) 0.469 3.437 0.004 0.377 3.487 0.003 
D(LNJAP(-4)) 0.327 3.397 0.005 0.273 4.115 0.001 
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D(LNCAN(-3)) 0.305 2.273 0.041 0.254 1.839 0.082 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 0.792 3.633 0.003 0.706 3.323 0.004 
WPIGSA(-2) -0.001 -1.804 0.094 -0.001 -1.912 0.071 
WPIGSA 0.001 4.113 0.001 0.001 3.586 0.002 
Jarq.-Bera Prob. 0.386   0.3   
Breusch-Godfr. F-prob. 0.8   0.795   
Ramsey RESET 0.607   0.93   
One-Step Forc. Test(a) 1   4   
N-Step Forc. Test(a)     1   3   
R2 adj. 0.956   0.959   
AIC -8.207   -8.094   
SIC -6.506   -6.597   
HQ -7.538   -   
DW 2.154   2.114   
see 0.004   0.004   
ssr 0.000   0.000   
No. of observations 63   63   
(a) number of observations which cast doubt on the assumption of parameter constancy 
 
 
Table 5B Accounting for the trade deficit/GDP 
(a) Regression 1 of Table 4B  
Variable aver. coeff  av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 1.84 1.84 246.49 
dlne 0.01 -1.51 -0.02 -2.53 
bdgdp(-2) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.49 
tdgdp(-1) 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.30 
dlngdp -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.05 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.12 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
others(a)    -245.79 
     
(b) Regression 2 of Table 4 B  
Variable aver. coeff  av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 1.63 1.63 217.79 
dlne 0.01 -1.46 -0.02 -2.46 
bdgdp(-2) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.52 
tdgdp(-1) 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.28 
dlngdp -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.05 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.07 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 0.03 
others(a)    -217.17 
     
(a) timesq and index of industrial production  
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Table 4C Trade deficit/GDP regression with monthly data  
                               Regression 1   Regression 2  
Variable Coeff. t-Stat. t-Prob. Coeff. t-Stat. t-Prob. 
C 0.997 1.715 0.110 0.739 2.966 0.008 
DLNE 0.126 5.136 0.000 0.120 7.092 0.000 
DLNE(-1) -0.097 -3.601 0.003 -0.097 -6.241 0.000 
DLNE(-2) -0.031 -1.646 0.124      -       -     - 
DLNE(-3) 0.242 8.991 0.000 0.210 0.019 0.000 
DLNE(-4) -0.102 -7.924 0.000 -0.089 0.014 0.000 
DLNE(-5) -0.156 -6.169 0.000 -0.142 0.018 0.000 
DLNE(-6) 0.034 0.431 0.673      -       -     - 
DLNE(-7) -0.386 -3.307 0.006 -0.305 -11.379 0.000 
DLNE(-8) 0.134 1.141 0.274 0.088 4.828 0.000 
DLNE(-9) -0.310 -3.090 0.009 -0.262 -8.736 0.000 
DLNE(-10) 0.109 1.237 0.238 0.114 3.059 0.007 
DLNE(-11) -0.242 -3.523 0.004 -0.260 -4.741 0.000 
DLNE(-12) 0.167 2.082 0.058 0.213 4.192 0.001 
DLNE(-13) -0.171 -3.013 0.010 -0.205 -5.466 0.000 
DLNE(-14) -0.048 -0.875 0.397        -      -     - 
DLNE(-15) 0.010 0.184 0.857        -      -     - 
DLNE(-16) -0.104 -2.329 0.037 -0.090 0.023 0.001 
DLNE(-17) -0.059 -1.204 0.250 -0.041 0.020 0.051 
DLNE(-18) 0.108 1.469 0.166 0.080 0.025 0.004 
DLNE(-19) -0.367 -4.769 0.000 -0.321 0.030 0.000 
DLNE(-20) 0.161 2.002 0.067 0.165 0.026 0.000 
DLNE(-21) -0.118 -2.791 0.015 -0.155 0.023 0.000 
DLNE(-22) -0.236 -3.608 0.003 -0.139 0.027 0.000 
DLNE(-23) 0.093 1.217 0.245      -      -      - 
DLNE(-24) -0.193 -2.720 0.018 -0.111 -6.822 0.000 
DLNE(-25) -0.169 -4.027 0.001 -0.175 -7.985 0.000 
DLNE(-26) -0.005 -0.201 0.844      -      -      - 
TDGDP(-1) 0.388 2.838 0.014 0.391 4.456 0.000 
BDGDP(-2) 0.070 2.216 0.045 0.077 2.540 0.020 
DLNGDP 0.071 4.553 0.001 0.070 6.057 0.000 
WPIGSI(-5) 0.008 3.571 0.003 0.009 10.209 0.000 
TIMESQ 0.000 6.943 0.000 0.000 11.036 0.000 
TDGDP(-2) 0.205 1.644 0.124 0.218 2.137 0.046 
D(LNUSA(-4)) -1.819 -6.082 0.000 -1.648 -7.494 0.000 
WPIGSI(-6) 0.006 2.289 0.040 0.004 3.709 0.002 
TIME              -           -     -    
D(LNGER(-1)) 0.406 3.339 0.005 0.320 4.034 0.001 
D(LNUK(-3))             -          -     -       -     -      - 
D(LNUSA(-1)) -0.749 -4.351 0.001 -0.646 -4.117 0.001 
D(LNUK(-1)) -0.892 -6.468 0.000 -0.655 -8.262 0.000 
D(LNJAP(-1)) 0.316 4.918 0.000 0.277 5.175 0.000 
D(LNGER(-2)) 0.925 5.931 0.000 0.769 5.626 0.000 
D(LNUSA(-2)) -0.912 -2.300 0.039 -0.782 -2.794 0.012 
D(LNUK(-2)) -0.247 -2.181 0.048 -0.196 -2.047 0.055 
LNFRA(-2) -0.213 -1.729 0.108 -0.158 -3.024 0.007 
D(LNGER(-3)) 0.436 3.557 0.004 0.302 2.789 0.012 
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D(LNJAP(-4)) 0.330 3.121 0.008 0.280 4.593 0.000 
D(LNCAN(-3)) 0.450 4.350 0.001 0.367 3.355 0.003 
D(LNCAN(-4)) 0.883 5.129 0.000 0.782 5.455 0.000 
WPIGSA(-2) -0.002 -2.967 0.011 -0.002 -4.859 0.000 
WPIGSA 0.001 2.548 0.024 0.001 3.275 0.004 
Jarq.-Bera Prob. 0.56   0.37   
Breusch-Godfr. F-prob. 0.37   0.35   
Ramsey RESET 0.764   0.868   
One-Step Forc. Test(a) 1   0   
N-Step Forc. Test(a)     3   5   
R2 adj. 0.947   0.949   
AIC -8.033   -7.865   
SIC -6.333   -6.368   
HQ -7.364   -   
DW 2.455   2.449   
see 0.004   0.004   
ssr 0.000   0.000   
No. of observations     63   63   
(a) number of observations which cast doubt on the assumption of parameter 
constancy 
 
Table 5C Accounting for the trade deficit/GDP 
(a) Regression 1 of Table 4C  
Variable aver. coeff av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 1.00 1.00 133.24 
dlne 0.01 -1.61 -0.02 -2.70 
bdgdp(-2) 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.47 
tdgdp 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.51 
dlngdp -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.05 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.28 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.09 
others(a)    -132.65 
     
(b) Regression 2 of Table 4C  
Variable aver. coeff av.*coeff percent 
tdgdp 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
const 1.00 0.74 0.74 98.72 
dlne 0.01 -1.40 -0.02 -2.36 
bdgdp(-2) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.52 
tdgdp 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.53 
dlngdp -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.05 
wpigsi 1.15 0.01 0.02 2.10 
wpigsa 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
others(a)    -98.38 
     
(a) timesq and index of industrial production  
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List of abbreviations 
 
(A)DF   (augmented) Dickey-Fuller 
AIC  Akaike information criterion 
ARCH(-x) autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with x lagged squared residuals 
av. or aver. average of a variable 
bdgdp  budget deficit as a share of GDP  
BG  Breusch-Godfrey 
c  constant 
coeff  coefficient 
CPI  consumer price index 
D(LNCAN(-4)) growth rate of monthly industrial production index of Canada with four 
lags 
dlne(-x) growth rate of exchange rate with lag x 
dlnef  forecast of growth of exchange rate 
dlnefsigma standard error of forecast from TARCH regression in Table 6 
dlnefsigma2 standard error of forecast from TARCH regression in Table 6b 
dlngdp  growth rate of the GDP of Brazil 
DW  Durbin-Watson statistic 
e  exchange rate (LCU per dollar) 
ERS-PO  Elliot-Rottemberg-Stock Point Optimal 
GDP  Gross domestic product  
gr.  growth 
HAC  Heteroscedasticity and autocorellation Corrected  
HQ  Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
I(x)  integration of order x 
infl  inflation 
LHS  left-hand side 
ln   natural log  
M2gr  growth of M2 (money and quasi money) 
ML  maximum likelihood 
pdl  polynomial distributed lag 
PP   Phillips-Perron 
RESE4 residual of equation 4 
see  standard error of estimation 
SIC  Schwarz information criterion 
ssr  sum of squared residuals 
tdgdp  trade deficit as a share of the GDP 
TARCH threshold autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
timesq  time index with exponent two 
wpigsa  whole sale price index global supply agriculture  
wpigsi  whole sale price index global supply industry 
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